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THE OUTSIDE DIRECTOR - SELECTION,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE
PUBLIC CORPORATION
AVERY S. COHEN*

Introduction
This article treats the general topic of the outside director. It is
necessary at the outset to distinguish among the classifications for
directors who may serve on the board of directors of a public company. Definitions are not available in statutes or published rules.
There has been very little guidance by regulatory agencies. Recently,
the New York Stock Exchange wrestled with the issue in a requirement that each listed company have an Audit Committee of
"independent directors.'' The New York Stock Exchange defines an
independent director as one who qualifies as an "outside director"
but may include former officers of the corporation. An outside director is defined to exclude officers, relatives thereof, employees, and
other. persons who are compensated on a regular basis by the company for services other than directorships. 2
The concept of independent directors suggests there may be three
classes of identifiable directors. The inside director, which includes
officers and employees of the company; non-independent outside
directors, which includes consultants to the company such as attorneys, bankers, and investment bankers whose corporations provide
the company with regular services, and relatives of inside directors;
and independent outside directors who have no present direct business relationship with the corporation on whose board they serve.
* Guren, Merritt, Sogg & Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio; A.B. (1958), Western Reserve
University; LL.B. (1961), Harvard University.
I Letter from William M. Batten, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
New York Stock Exchange, to chief executive officers of companies listed on the Exchange (Sept. 3, 1976) (letter on file at Washington and Lee Law Review).
2 The term outside director,with respect to an Audit Committee, shall be persons
wh6 are not officers, or relatives thereof, employees, former officers, consultants, or
persons who are not otherwise compensated on a regular basis by the company other
than by directors' fees. The following are examples of persons who would not qualify
as outside directorsfor the purposes of an Audit Committee:
Anyone who would be classified as or represent a parent, controlling
person, or affiliate under SEC usage of these terms, or anyone who
would be an "associate" of such person;
Anyone who would be classified as an associate of any officer or employee of the company;
Outside legal counsel to the company.
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The changing requirements of board membership represent a
number of competing considerations, not all of which can be predicted in the current environment. Until recently, the amount of time
which a member of a board of directors had to devote to the corporation was relatively limited. Compensation was also quite low. There
had been little awareness of the liabilities which attach to board
membership. Most public corporations devoted little time to the education of directors in the operation of the corporation of their attendant liability. Only recently have corporations begun to revise their
procedures in light of pronouncements by publicly respected persons,3
members of the Securities and Exchange Commission,' and in
judicial decisions.' It is not fair to imply that the legal principles
were not understood prior to recent decisions, but there had been
inadequate attention given to the potential for director liability.
Another competing consideration is balance in the makeup of
board membership. For a long period of time, ownership of shares in
large public companies has been so diffuse that few companies had
more than one or two representatives who served on the board primarily because of equity ownership. Other persons were elected to the
board because of non-equity financial interests, such as representatives of banks and investment bankers. Little consideration was given
to representation of community interest, balance in terms of race,
color, or sex. Now there is considerable pressure to achieve representation for non-financial interests.
The increasing awareness of responsibility and liability has
caused a number of persons who traditionally served on many boards
See Corporate Rights and Responsibilities:Hearingson S-261-1 Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (June 15, 1976) (statement of

A.A. Sommer, Jr.); Arthur Goldberg on Public Directors, Bus. & Soc. REv., Spring,
1973, at 35.
See Address by SEC Commissioner P. Loomis, Jr., Director Responsibility-A
Government View, given at Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr. 8, 1975); Sommer, Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,669
(Feb. 21, 1974); Address by SEC Chairman G. Cook, DirectorsResonsibilities, given
at Southern Methodist University (Apr. 6, 1973) reported at [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH)
79,302; Corporate Governance-New Heat on Outside
Director's?,FORBES, Oct 1, 1977, at 33.
1 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., [19761977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,887 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 1977); SEC
v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,807 (D.D.C., Oct. 1, 1974); Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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to either limit their board membership or to withdraw in toto. Investment bankers are a prime example of that withdrawal. Commercial
bankers have also begun to reassess their position, both under securities and trade regulation laws.'
The duties of boards of directors to monitor management's performance, to have access to and to utilize corporate advisers such as
accountants and attorneys, and ultimately to determine integrity as
well as performance of management are new phenomena. At the very
time the pressure to revise board membership is increasing, there is
also a dramatic increase in the responsibilities of persons serving as
board members. These pressures are separate from, but must coordinate with, the three classifications noted above: inside, nonindependent outside, and independent outside directors. The outside
director begins to take on a responsibility far beyond that which has
been historically required and well beyond that for which most directors have been adequately trained.
It is within this framework that the search is initiated for directors
who are impartial, not affiliated with management (or maybe employees), and who have no significant personal interest in the continuation or promulgation of management policies or activities. In fact,
they should have no reason to protect management itself. While the
issue is normally stated in terms of shareholder protection, it has
become increasingly clear that the board must contend with not only
shareholder interests, but the interests of the community, the employees, and others as well.
There are several companies which have made dramatic changes
in the composition and operation of their boards of directors. Two
which are commonly noted are Texas Instruments and Connecticut
General Insurance Corporation.' The Texas Instruments Board is
composed of a majority of non-management directors who commit to
serve a minimum of thirty calendar days and as many as eighty
calendar days each year. They are required to participate in all aspects of board activities including committee assignments and committee chairmanships. There are also directors who come to their
positions by virtue of former association with the company. These
directors must serve at least fifteen days a year in comparable types
of positions. A third category is those directors who are currently
£

See, e.g., United States v. The Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D.Ohio

1974).

See Mace, Designing a Plan for the Ideal Board, HIxv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1976, at 20 (discussing Texas Instruments); Board Power, FoRBES, July 1, 1976, at 47
(discussing Connecticut General Insurance Corporation).
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serving as officers of the company or employees of the company.
The Connecticut General Insurance Corporation in 1976 adopted
a definition of the role of the board of directors which expressly severs
management from the board. The amendment provides that the
board of directors is "the guardian of the interests of those who have
a stake in the health of the enterprise . . . (including) stockholders,
• . . customers, employees, suppliers, the communities in which it

operates and society as a whole."
The changing environment was summarized by A. A. Sommer,
Jr., when he said:
The situation is changing dramatically and drastically. I
would suggest that persons asked to join boards of publicly
held companies now do so only after reflecting carefully upon
the responsibilities they assume and the availability of time to
perform adequately; gone are the days when it would be regarded as a badge of merit for an investment banker to be on
half a hundred or more boards of directors. Corporations,
aware of the necessity of greater board involvement in their
affairs, have developed a number of devices to achieve that.
Audit committees are becoming routine and numerous conversations with both auditors and members of boards of directors
have indicated the utility, nay, the necessity, of this mechanism. Many corporations are strengthening the influence of the
outside directors by involving them not only on the audit committee but other committees as well, and by expanding the
number of board members without significant financial affiliations with the corporation. Many boards have added so-called
"professional directors" (a term which I regard as a misnomer)
who are expected, usually for additional compensation, to
spend more time on the affairs of the corporation than the
typical director; two significant examples of such people have
been Robert Haack, formerly president of the New York Stock
Exchange, now head of Lockheed, and Joseph W. Barr, formerly Secretary of the Treasury. I speak of the term
"professional director" as a misappellation; rather, I think of
those men commonly called that as simply directors who expend larger amounts of their time of the affairs of the corporation and thus can constitute a helpful bridge between the other
outside directors and management.'
CorporateRights and Responsibilities: Hearings on S-261-1 Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, 61-62 (June 15, 1976) (statement

of A. A. Sommer, Jr.).
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The Role of the Outside Director
As already noted, any discussion of the role of the outside director
must take into account that the outside director may be nonindependent (at least in part) or may be totally independent. In
addition to determining the degree of independence of the outside
director, it is necessary to focus upon the charter or code of responsibility which is to be imposed upon directors generally and the outside
director specifically. That must include an analysis of the responsibility of the large public company. The business corporation has
mixed social responsibilities as well as a responsibility to obtain maximum profit for the benefit of its shareholders. Obviously, the social
responsibilities may impinge upon the profit motive.' Since 1970,
there has been significant legislation adding to the social responsibility of corporations. Laws designed to protect the environment,"° fairemployment practices,' and safety standards for employees 2 are examples. Directors must devote increasing attention to corporate compliance with these various statutes.
Of course, the independent director will recognize that the interests of management and shareholders are often not identical. Target
companies in takeover bids as well as companies considering going
private represent prime opportunities to observe the distinction between the interests of management and the interests of shareholders.
As a result of the divergence between the interest of management
and shareholders, large corporations on occasion may attempt to convert their boards of directors into non-boards. The independent director may serve management better by serving only as a figurehead.
The chief executive can "put his back-seat drivers to sleep."' 3 While
large corporations can tolerate boards which are relatively active,
smaller corporations often have directors who exert too great a power.
"These directors. . . keep pulling up the flowers to see how the roots
are growing.""
I For an interesting study of the development of the laws governing corporations
from 1890-1970, see J. HURST, THE LEGrmIMACY OF T BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (1970).
10See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361
(1970); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857(h)-7 (1970); Environmental Control Act
of 1972, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (Supp. IV 1974).
" See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970);
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1970).
,z See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1970).
13R. TOWNSEND, UP TE ORGANIZATION 49 (1970).
" Id. at 51.
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While historically directors were thought to be entitled to rely
upon the honesty and integrity of executives until something occurred to raise their suspicion,"5 more recent cases indicate that the
level of responsibility is significantly higher."6 The Securities and
Exchange Commission, as well as the courts, has stirred a revolution
in the thinking as to the responsibility of outside directors. The Commission has insisted that there be committees to handle problems of
disclosure, of questionable'payments,"7 and, of course, to review the
audit and related procedures. The Commission has suggested in
numerous written materials on the subject that directors are expected
to be active and deal with management at arm's length. 8
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 193311 represents the most awesome exposure to possible liability for outside directors. It requires
that these directors have significant legal, financial, and operational
knowledge of the corporation whenever a registration statement is
filed. The registration statement normally is prepared by specialized
legal counsel in conjunction with management. Management's function is to provide the basic necessary knowledge of the company's
operations. The outside director is by statute placed in an arm'slength position where he must establish that he has independently
checked the written product in order to protect investors. A similar
responsibility arises under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with the preparation of proxy statements."0 The responsibility which the SEC defines for the outside director has been dem'" See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125,
(1963).
" SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,807 (D.D.C., Oct. 1, 1974); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853
(D. Del. 1972); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" SEC v. Mattel, Inc, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,807 (D.D.C., Oct. 1, 1974).
1"See, e.g., C. BROWN, PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK, (1976); C. STONE,

WHERE THE LAW ENDS,

(1975); Cabot, Louis W. Cabot On An Effective Board, HARV.

Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 40; Arthur Goldberg on Public Directors, Bus. & Soc.
REv., Spring, 1975, at 35; Mann, A ProgramEnabling Non-Management Directorsto
Comply With Their Responsibilitiesfor Ensuring Adequate Disclosure, in PLI Fivrr
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURrrIES REGULATION, (Fleischer, Mundheim, Schupper 1974);
Sommer, Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 79,669
(Feb. 21, 1974); Stone, Public DirectorsMerit a Try, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1976,
at 20; Address by SEC Commissioner P. Loomis, Jr., DirectorResponsibility-A Government View, given at Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland (April 8, 1975).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
2 See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del.
1972).
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onstrated in the recent report on the Sterling-Homex Corporation.2 '
The Commission alleged that the company's financial statements
were fraudulent. It did not specifically allege that the outside directors knew that the statements were fraudulent. Instead, the SEC took
the position that the inside directors misled the outside directors.
Yet, the outside directors were included in the consent injunction
because at the board meetings there had been little interrogation or
questioning of management. Interestingly, there had been no written
agenda for board meetings. It would seem that by this time most
public corporations would circulate an agenda prior to the meeting,
and in no event would have a meeting without circulating an agenda
at the meeting.
The Board of Directors of Sterling-Homex had in essence delegated its decisionmaking powers to the Executive Committee. The
Executive Committee was apparently the only operating committee
of the Board. The corporation did not provide board members with
memoranda to assist them in their decisionmaking responsibility, did
not provide opportunity to test accounting principles, and did not
provide timely, accurate, or complete information with respect to the
business operations of the company. As it became more apparent that
the corporation was in financial difficulty, the outside directors did
not involve themselves to a greater extent in the company affairs. In
short, the SEC concluded that the outside directors "did not provide
the shareholders with any significant protection in fact, nor did their
presence on the board have the impact upon the company's operations which shareholders and others might reasonably have expected."' 1
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Shiell
In December, 1976, the SEC filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division, entitled Securities and Exchange Commission v. Shiell.2 The
action is one seeking an injunction against various officers, directors,
and professionals who had been associated with The Commonwealth
Corporation (TCC) prior to its filing a Petition for Reorganization
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Included in the allegations
of the Complaint is the charge that the directors "exercised or should
have exercised control over" the corporation. The Complaint notes
that the president of the company "was the sole office of TCC . ..
11FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) %8219 (1975).
2 Id.
z No. 76:204 (N.D. Fla., filed Dec. 2, 1976).
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reporting directly to the directors."
The position of the SEC is spelled out in great detail in an accompanying affidavit filed with the Complaint signed by a staff accountant and senior investigator. The affidavit quotes directly from the
testimony of two directors as follows:
In the late 1960's, the Board of Directors were concerned about
the rapid growth of the construction loan department. With
this thought in mind, a limit was voted on the amount of
construction loans that the Company could be involved in at
one time. The president was strongly opposed to this limitation, feeling that this was the most lucrative part of the Company's business.
From time to time the president would show the Directors a
record of the construction loan business, which showed constantly increasing income and few, if any, losses. He accompanied this with his strong recommendations that limitations on
construction lending be lifted. With his continued success in
this area, the Board removed the limitation on construction
lending. This limitation was lifted sometime in 1971.
The Directors monitored the construction lending fairly closely
for a short period thereafter and, having received assurances
that the Company's management was proceeding prudently,
allowed the further expansion of construction lending thereafter.
As time went on, the Directors felt that Mr. Shiell's continued
success in handling these construction matters was ample
proof that he was right and that construction lending was a
good idea for the Company...
The charge against the outside directors continues in affidavit
form as follows:
(c) The minutes and agendas [sic] of the Board of Directors
meetings starting at least in 1972 reflect that the directors had
in effect relinquished substantial control over Shiell. The
directors, as "outside" directors, relied upon Shiell as their
sole source for all information regarding the activities and operations of TCC. The minutes do not reflect that any other
officers of TCC were present at any meetings nor did the directors require any other officer to report to them regarding the
activities of TCC to any significant extent.
The testimony of the directors indicates that they did not
deem it necessary to have other officers present at the meetings
for they believed (by accepting Shiell's reports at face value)
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that they were getting accurate and complete information from
Shiell. Additionally, they felt that questioning other officers
about TCC's activities or, in fact, requiring other officers to
report to them independently of Shiell would "constitute an
intrusion into the functions of management". ... Even when
the directors visited the TCC offices from time to time, and
encountered other key officers, there were few discussions regarding TCC's activities ....
(d) An examination of the minutes and agendas [sic] of the
meetings of the Board indicates that from at least 1972 on, the
directors would receive financial reports, monthly reports as to
ratios of foreclosures and rates of delinquency regarding the
permanent mortgages serviced by TCC; opening of new bank
lines by TCC; changes in personnel; budget forecasts, and production reports of loan closings which included both C&D
loans and permanent loans. The minutes and agendas [sic]
reflect that the information that the directors received was
voluminous but examination reveals that much of this information was general and in some instances lacked specific information as to certain material aspects of TCC's activities. For
example, the monthly reports of rate of foreclosures and delinquencies submitted by Shiell at the board meetings dealt exclusively with defaults ofresidential mortgages that TCC services for permanent investors who owned these mortgages and
who bore all risk of loss. There was no risk of loss to TCC other
than a possible diminution of TCC's service fees if there was a
foreclosure. Conversely, where TCC had a real liability and
possible loss of income stemming from the C&D loans, the
directors did not receive nor did they request regular reports
of foreclosure, defaults, delinquencies, or arrearages other than
general oral assurances from Shiell, who indicated that TCC
was not encountering difficulties. . .. The directors accepted
these assurances without any independent verification. While
TCC avoided foreclosure of C&D loans, the evidence clearly
indicates that TCC carried builders who were failing to pay
their loans at maturity or who were in arrears for as long as six
months. The directors have testified they did not request any
report as to the status of outstanding C&D loans. In addition,
while the directors knew of the tremendous expansion of the
C&D activity and the resultant effect of increased earnings for
the years 1972 and 1973, the directors admitted that they never
specifically requested any of the following information with
respect to C&D loans:
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(1) Who the largest borrowers from TCC were;
(2) What was their financial condition;
(3) The number of projects that TCC was financing for
a particular builder and what financial exposure TCC
faced thereon;
(4) The progress of particularly large projects;
(5) The delinquencies or arrearages of C&D borrowers
from TCC and what direct or indirect exposure faced
TCC, and
(6) Whether TCC had granted more than one mortgage loan on the project ....
With respect to disclosure in the financial statements, the affidavit states the following:
(f) Further, the directors did not review the unconsolidated
audited and unaudited statements for TCC and its wholly
owned subsidiaries. The TCC files reflect that for each annual
and semi-annual audit of TCC performed by the accounting
firm of John W. Hosford and Co., TCC was audited both on
an unconsolidated and consolidated basis and likewise each
subsidiary was audited separately. The accountants supplied
the officers of TCC with all of these statements. Nevertheless,
the unconsolidated statements were never given to the directors by Hosford or by the officers, nor were they ever asked for
by the directors. According to Teague . . . the directors relied
on the consolidated audited statements and, based upon this
reliance, assumed they were getting all appropriate information and, accordingly, saw no need to examine the unconsolidated statements. These statements, particularly the unconsolidated audited and unaudited statement of TCC up to July
31, 1973, contained numerous schedules, some of which indicated the name of each borrower from TCC and the amount
so borrowed.
The affidavit finally sums up the charge of neglect on the part of
the directors as follows:
While the facts in paragraph "50" above indicate a failure by
the directors to adequately inquire into the activities of TCC,
a failure to exert sufficient control over management and a
failure to require responsible reportingfrom management, the
focal point of the charges against the directors is that both just
prior and subsequent to the offering of May 6, 1974, the directors were on notice of TCC's deteriorative financial condition
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and failed to take timely affirmative action to withdraw the
offer and sale of the investment certificates and common stock
covered in the May 6, 1974 public offering. [Emphasis
added.]
The Complaint in the Shiell case along with the Sterling-Homex
Consent Decree noted earlier are ample evidence that the SEC is not
only prepared to talk about the responsibility of directors, but to
enforce liability in connection therewith.
Stanley Sporkin, head of the SEC's Enforcement Division, stated
in a speech before the Business League Conference on Corporate
Directors that "our corporate managers over the years learned that
they in effect had unfettered control of the corporation to do exactly
as they pleased and not too many questions would be asked as long
as they showed an upward earnings trend." 2' He suggested several
massive reforms which included the following:
(1) Give non-insider public shareholders board representation even though it might be disproportionate to their holdings;
(2) Establish a mechanism to take the selection process for
directors-at-large and the board's- audit committee out of the
hands of management, to ensure board independence;
(3) Find a way to sanction directors who do not perform their
functions;
(4) Enable the independent director to assure the appointment of adequate and disinterested counsel, who will represent
only the corporation's interest;
(5) Provide the audit committee with adequate powers and
high-calibre, independent directors; and
(6) Appoint a "Business Practices Officer" to ferret out improper business practices within the corporation and bring
them to the attention of the Board.
DirectorsAppointed With Court Consent
In recent years a new phenomenon has developed in the election
of outside directors. This is most often demonstrated by the consent
appointment of independent outside directors in connection with the
entry of a consent decree in an action brought by the SEC.2 These
21 As reported in EXEcUTIVE DisCLOsuRE GumE, (CCH) SEC Compliance, Vol. 2,
No. 14 (July 7, 1977).
5.082
See, e.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d
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directors have had no previous material contact with the company on
whose board they will then serve. There is no present statistical base
to ascertain whether the presence of such directors results in materially more information being made available to the board, differences
in board votes, or even subsequent changes in management (excluding those changes which may be part of the consent decree).
It is highly probable that the presence of these appointed independent directors causes the management of the corporation to provide
more significant information to the board before seeking board approval of material alterations in the company's course of conduct.
Their presence may also encourage greater disclosure to the board of
the nature of the corporation's activities.
It is basic to the federal statutory scheme that responsibility for
greater disclosure brings better critical thought to the decisionmaking process. It is all but impossible to prove that fewer mistakes occur
because of careful thought processes, but our planning processes accept care as an axiom for better performance.
While the jury must remain out for some time on the contribution
of appointed outside directors, there have been a number of proposals
26
for the utilization of public directors for large public corporations.
In an atmosphere where so many corporations of size, magnitude, and
historic high reputation have admitted engaging in various illegal
and/or immoral activity, it is not surprising that there are pressures
to place on boards of directors persons who do not have pre-existing
relationships with management. The "old boys club" is in serious and
proper jeopardy. Although agreeing that independent outside directors should include persons who are not close friends, relatives, or
other business associates of management, it is hard to understand
why these persons should be unknown to management. It is not a
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); SEC v. Tilco, Inc., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,240 (D.D.C. Oct. 15,
1971); SEC v. Bio-Medical Services, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 6700
(Jan. 28, 1975); SEC v. Chapter Securities Management Corp., SEC
Lit. Release No. 6593, (Nov. 21, 1974); SEC v. Charter Diversified
Services, SEC Lit. Release No. 6507 (Sep. 9, 1974); SEC v. Mattel,
Inc. (D.D.C. 1974), SEC Lit. Release No. 6467, (Aug. 8, 1974), No.
6431, (Oct. 2, 1974), and No. 6532 (Oct. 3, 1974); SEC v. WestgateCalifornia Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 6142 (Nov. 9, 1973); SEC v.
Canadian Javelin, Ltd. SEC Lit. Release No. 6054 (Sep. 12, 1973);
SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corporation, SEC Lit. Release No. 6054
(Sep. 12, 1973); SEC v. International Controls Corp. (IOS-VescoICC), SEC Lit. Release No. 5643 (Nov. 27, 1972).
21 Stone, Public Directors Merit a Try, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 20.
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recommendation of this article that public directors be appointed to
the boards of directors of corporations by. anything other than the
elective process. However, it would be wise to provide independent
outside directors several very important tools for effectiveness:
1. Compensation should be adequate to allow the director to
devote considerable time to his undertaking.
2. The independent director should have available to him
staff from the corporation and within reasonable limitations be
empowered to retain outside experts as needed.
3. Each significant corporate committee should include these
persons as directors. To the extent they are not included in the
committee, they should be entitled to attend committee meetings.
Reclassifying the Board
In determining who should serve on the board of directors and
what the appropriate balance of persons should be, the following are
suggested guidelines that ought to be attempted by publicly held
corporations. First, it must be recognized that corporations of differing size will have differing abilities to attract quality outside directors. There are several crude, but not inaccurate, measuring sticks.'
In the current legal-economic environment in which relatively few
companies are "going public" and relatively few public companies
are seeking to change their trading markets from over-the-counter to
listing on an exchange or from listing on one exchange to another, we
have a fairly static working model from which to experiment.
The definition of directors should be divided into three categories
suggested above: inside director, non-independent outside director,
and independent outside director. The inside director is a person who
receives material compensation or devotes the most significant portion of his time to the corporation in a capacity other than as a
director. The non-independent outside director is a person who is
either related to an inside director, is an employee of the inside director, or receives directly or indirectly material compensation for services other than board membership. Thus, lawyers, business consultants, or even the company's commercial bank representative would
be considered a non-independent outside director. The independent
outside director is a person who receives no material compensation
directly or indirectly from the corporation for services other than
board membership.
It is necessary to recognize that the availability of qualified persons for boards of directors will vary. The rules cannot be the same
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for all corporations. The boards of directors of corporations listed on
the New York Stock Exchange over a period of no more than five
years should alter their composition so that no less than one-third of
their total membership includes independent outside directors and
no less than one-third includes non-independent outside directors.
All other companies listed on any exchange should require themselves
to have no less than 25 percent of their board memberships made up
of independent outside directors and no less than 25 percent of nonindependent outside directors. Only a minority of the board should
be management directors. Although companies listed on the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation should strive
to achieve the breakdown suggested for listed companies, many of
these companies will find it difficult to entice 25 percent of their
board membership from independent outside persons. Under all circumstances, their boards should contain a majority of nonmanagement ("outside") directors. Other publicly held companies
should strive for the attainment of significant independent and significant non-independent representation on the board of directors,
but should not be held to the same standards.
Having composed the board on a basis of three major classifications, it is now desirable to view who should be included within those
classifications. Independent outside directors should not be persons
who have had any previous relationship with the company. While it
is desirable that they be shareholders, it does not seem that that
should be a necessary element in their qualification. To have persons
buying insignificant numbers of shares so the proxy statement will
indicate ownership does not make any real economic sense. It must
be acknowledged that to some degree the independent outside director may represent interests adverse to those of the main body of
shareholders. In part, the independent outside director is the review
person for such things as integrity of management, compliance with
regulatory schemes, and, most important, the community conscience. This is not to say that the independent outside director should
not be concerned with earnings and profits or other types of economic
progress. To ignore these realities would eventually be the downfall
of the corporation.
To the extent possible, the independent outside director should
bring to the corporation special expertise. Experience within the industry, general management experience, expertise in areas in which
the corporation from time to time needs guidance are all desirable
elements in the selection of the independent outside director.
Corporations should have significant opportunities to recruit this
type of independent outside director since the average age of all direc-
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tors is currently fifty seven and outside directors average fifty eight.27
As directors grow older, both death and retirement will assist in the
turnover of board membership so that the objectives stated above can
be achieved.
The selection of the independent outside director should not be
in the exclusive domain of the chief executive officer. It would probably be helpful to utilize present outside directors as a nominating
committee. It is more comfortable to have current board members
developing the selection process than government agencies or courts.
Anticipating that individuals will accept fewer board positions, it will
not be easy to find persons with experience who are also willing to
serve on many additional boards. Each position will require greater
attention, and few candidates can devote significant attention to
many boards. It will be necessary to engage in research beyond normal circles to find appropriate persons; for example, there is a growing pool among women and minority groups who have historically not
been selected for board membership. It is not being suggested that
prospective independent directors should be disqualified because
they are known to present board members, graduates of the same
universities, members of the same clubs, or if they live in the same
neighborhoods. It is being suggested that the search for directors
should not be contained within these parameters.
A significant source of independent outside directors can be found
among senior management of other companies. Historically, only the
top officers of corporations became board members of other major
corporations. It is both necessary and desirable to make use of a
broader base of senior management in the selection of independent
outside directors. These persons should be allowed to serve on other
company boards so long as there is no conflict of interest.
The selection of a non-independent outside board member is considerably less complicated. These persons already have some contact
with the corporation. They may even have intimate knowledge of
certain or all phases of the corporate activity. Attorneys and retired
officers are probably the most representative persons in this group,
but many other persons can be added without difficulty. Bank officers and investment bankers should be included. The independence
which these individuals exercise will vary based in part upon their
personal standards. Because these persons are working with the corporation in other capacities, they will from time to time have insight
n
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not generally available to the other outside directors. In both the
Sterling-Homex consent decree and the complaint in the Shiell case
discussed above,2 the SEC criticized the lack of contact of the board
members with corporate personnel other than top management.
At least one member of management in addition to the chief executive officer should serve on the board of directors. That person represents an additional conduit to the board on corporate activity as well
as a conduit from the board to the organization. Unless there is such
a source of information, the board is in a less tenable position in the
event that it wants to review the capability of its chief executive
officer or consider the possibility of replacing that executive.
The large shareholder who serves on the board of directors who has
no other capacity within the corporation may well be considered in a
special capacity unrelated to any of the three categories above. Large
shareholders who are not part of management normally are in that
position for one of three reasons: (1) the founding family continues
to own large amounts of stock but has no family members continuing
in the business; (2) the large block has been acquired as an interest
adverse to present management; or (3) the large block has been acquired either to assist or place management in its present position.
If it is clearly established that the large shareholder is essentially
adverse to management, that board representative should be considered as an independent outside director. Otherwise, it is suggested
that the large shareholders should be considered as non-independent
outside directors.
Orientationof Board Members
No person should stand for election to the board of directors of a
publicly held corporation without certain minimal investigation. The
investigation is not to determine whether the company has problems,
which most companies do, but to be knowledgeable as to problems
and opportunities.
The orientation of members of the board of directors should include an opportunity to review current financial data. This should
include the Form 10-K filed with the SEC and subsequent Form 10Qs as well as recent financial information circulated to the board of
directors. The new member of the board should have available the
consultation of financial officers of the company who should be able
to explain the financials in depth. In addition, new board members
should have an opportunity to view some of the corporate facilities,
2 See text accompanying notes 14 & 16 supra.
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meet with corporate officers, and an opportunity to meet with corporate advisors such as the outside attorneys and accountants.
There is some danger in setting designated minimal standards by
which a new board member is considered adequately educated to
commence board service. It does not seem wise to set absolute standards of liability based upon inadequate orientation. Experience as
to the reasons that outside board members have not performed adequately does not indicate elements in the orientation process which
would have protected against inadequate performance. Ongoing diligence is the touchstone for success.
Those corporations which have operations at varying locations
should from time to time have board meetings at or near such locations so that the board members may view the facilities. As will be
discussed, the care and planning of a board meeting is of critical
importance to successful board contributions.
Although membership on committees will give certain board
members special expertise, it cannot and should not be forgotten that
liability extends to all board members and that it is therefore necessary that all board members have input from committees as well as
the opportunity to make contributions to the various committees of
the board. New board members will be well advised occasionally to
attend meetings of committees on which they do not serve. A more
delicate question with respect to orientation is the access which board
members should have to company personnel on an informal or otherwise unregulated basis. Many chief executive officers would find regular visits by members of the board of directors to company operations and inquiries of company personnel to be disruptive. The objective of a free flow of information may best be handled by providing
the outside board members (both independent and non-independent)
with special staff who would handle visits and questions on a formal
and scheduled basis. The objective of providing a free flow of information should not overshadow the equally important objective of
maintaining smooth operation of the business enterprise.
Some special recommendations for the new board member are as
follows: at the time of accepting the nomination, the board member
should determine that the following procedures are followed by the
corporation or will be initiated:
1. Board meetings will be held on a regular basis.
2. An agenda will be circulated within a reasonable period
prior to each meeting.
3. There will be a continuous flow of information to directors.
4. There will be an opportunity to meet with outside experts
as well as management persons who do not serve on the board.
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5. Major proposals will be submitted as soon as reasonable in
advance of action.
6. It is socially acceptable within the board to dissent and/or
to present philosophical differences.
7. Minutes of both the board meetings and committee meetings are to be maintained and circulated.
Committees
Naturally, the board of directors cannot focus its attention on all
of its obligations as a committee of the whole. Recent pressures,
particularly from the New York Stock Exchange and SEC would
indicate that some committees of the board are expected to serve in
a very special capacity somewhat independent from the board of
directors. The Audit Committee is the prime example. The Audit
Committee will on occasion make judgments which are not in accord
with those most desired by management. It is therefore necessary
that care be exercised in selecting the membership of that committee.
Historically, the most important committee of the board of directors has been the Executive Committee. While it may now have lost
some of its importance to the Audit Committee, it continues to be the
committee with the greatest flexibility for power. There are no rules
as to persons who may or must serve on the Executive Committee.
Normally, the Executive Committee consists of a minority of the
board. The chief executive officer, one or two inside directors, and one
or two outside directors are commonly on the Executive Committee.
Unlike other committees, the Executive Committee is frequently recognized by state statute. The board may delegate to the Executive
Committee certain powers which would otherwise be powers of the
board itself. Most corporations provide for the existence of an Executive Committee within their corporate by-laws and/or charter or articles of incorporation. The responsibilities of the Executive Committee are designated by the board of directors. Some executive committees have broad ranges of power, while others possess fairly narrow
authority.
The Executive Committee should include outside directors. Both
the independent outside directors and non-independent outside
directors should be included. It is a personal observation that most
executive- committees have a majority of inside directors. It is recommended that executive committees draw a majority of their membership from among the outside directors, to serve the same function, in
essence, as is served by those directors on the board as a whole.
Generally, the Executive Committee is charged with the responsibility of acting between board meetings. For some executive commit-
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tees, meetings are scheduled on a regular basis between board meetings, while other executive committees only meet irregularly. It is
recommended that regular meetings be held.
Certain powers should not be delegated to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee should not have the power to amend
or recommend for shareholder action amendments of corporate charters, and should neither create nor fill vacancies among officers who
are elected by the board. Certain financial matters such as the declaration of dividends should not be acted upon by the Executive Committee. While the Executive Committee may make recommendations
on the compensation of officers, the final determfination should be a
matter for the board of directors. Of course, the Executive Committee
should not act contrary to, rescind, or otherwise nullify action taken
by the board of directors. The Executive Committee should also be
limited in its power to dispose of property or other assets of the
corporation. There should also be limitations on the amount of debt
which the Executive Committee can incur on behalf of the corporation.
On the other hand, the Executive Committee can handle many
of the problems which arise from time to time. It is also in a position
to refine and then make definitive recommendations to the board of
directors with respect to issues that are appropriate for board action
only. The Executive Committee is the natural committee for the
assignment of special projects or topics. The Executive Committee
should relieve the board of many of the routine tasks which boards
of directors have. For example, the committee should be able to review budgets, lower-level salaries, leases, bank agreements, and may
even be charged with the responsibility of allocating *corporatecontributions. Long-range planning and other major decisions should be
reviewed by that committee before going to the board of directors.
In most large corporations division presidents are usually not represented on the board of directors and only appear at such meetings
for special occasions. The Executive Committee is in a position to
meet with heads of divisions on a regular basis and have a better
understanding of the operations of those divisions. As a result of these
meetings the Executive Committee is in a better position to review
corporate budgets and policies before presentation to the board. A
conscientious Executive Committee should reduce the exposure of
both the members of the29Executive Committee and other members
of the board of directors.
21

Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse Inc., 51 Misc.2d 188, 273
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The other highly important committee of the board of directors
is the Audit Committee. This is a committee which, as noted above,
should be structured to include primarily or exclusively outside directors." When possible, members of the Audit Committee should have
a financial background. An outside director, preferably an independent outside director, should act as chairman of the committee. The
Audit Committee is a committee which will not meet as regularly as
the Executive Committee, but will have a period during the year
when it will meet with greater intensity. The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee should be carefully outlined and adopted
by the board of directors. These duties must include a review of the
financial statements with the independent auditors. During this review the Audit Committee must make inquiry into the financial practices of the corporation. Areas of special interest will include changes
in accounting principles and practice, sensitive reporting, adjustments in financial statements from period to period, evaluation of
both the understandability and readability of the financial statements as well as a review of the total disclosure encompassed in the
financial statements.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for non-professionals to keep
abreast of pronouncements of the various accounting standards promulgated by both the accounting profession and the SEC. Yet, the
Audit Committee must make a detailed effort to determine that the
standards are being met.
All of the large accounting firms have published guides directed
to the Audit Committee to assist them in their function. No Audit
Committee should operate without having reviewed the guide published by an auditing firm other than that which audits the corporation.
In addition to reviewing the audit, to a degree the Audit Committee is also reviewing the auditor. The Audit Committee must have
confidence that the independent accountants have maintained some
continuity of staff while at the same time rotating staff. There must
be adequate services available to the corporation from the independent accounting firm to perform the audit effectively and to make
N.Y.2d 16 (1966); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Goff v. Emde, 32
Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928). For an informative discussion of boards of directors
see Address by SEC Commissioner P. Loomis, Jr., DirectorResponsibility-A Government View, given at Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr. 8, 1977). See also
Mace, Designing a Plan for the Ideal Board, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 20.
11 For a discussion of management's role with the Audit Committee see Lam,
Management Representationon Audit Committees, THE C.P.A. J., Nov. 1975, at 33.
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recommendations for improvements in the financial reporting of the
corporation. Of course, the Audit Committee must also end its work
with confidence that the management of the corporation has cooperated adequately in the audit process.
The Preparationof a Philosophy for Board Activity
The public corporation should define in writing the duties which
its directors undertake. Working with the management, the board of
directors should articulate its functions and duties. Having defined
its task, the board will be in a better position to review its membership, to make plans for retirements, attrition, and additional memberships on the board.
There must be a regular flow of written materials from the corporation to the board of directors to inform the board of the operation
of the company and to periodically and regularly update the board
on the results which the company is achieving. The objectives ought
to be stated for the board and ought to be utilized as measuring tools
for management performance. It is for the board to determine if management's goals are appropriate, if the goals are being met, and if not,
why not.
It is very difficult for the board of directors to define its constituency. At least until such time as laws are amended, no board member can defend with confidence on the basis that his constituency is
more narrowly defined than other board members. In today's world,
the constituency includes not only shareholders, but also employees
and the communities in which the corporation has significant operations. The investing public is also part of the constituency.
A corporate director stands in a position of trust and confidence with respect to the corporation he serves and its stockholders: While he is technically not a trustee, he does have
responsibilities of a fiduciary nature. He must not only protect
the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but
must also refrain from doing anything to work injury to the
corporation or to deprive it of the profit or advantage that his
skill and ability might properly bring to it.3'
Diligent attendance at directors' meetings, at meetings of committees on which the director serves is highly important. It is also
important that directors be keenly aware of potential conflicts of
3' W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFIcERs AND DmrCroRs 1 (1969).
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interest. This is particularly so with outside directors who may be
serving on other boards or have other capacities where a conflict may
develop. Directors also have a responsibility to maintain a current
understanding of developments in the industry. This can probably
best be accomplished by reading trade journals and business periodicals which affect the industry. Being too busy is not an excuse. 2
Summary
The philosophy presented above is not a panacea for the operation
of boards of public companies. It is instead an outline of a method
which should bring boards of directors to a higher level of service and
at the same time bring management more effective boards of directors.
32 See, e.g., Boddy v. Theiling, 129 Ga.App. 273, 199 S.E.2d 379 (1973) (director,
too busy to attend meetings, found liable as having participated in an illegal sale under
the Georgia Blue Sky Laws).
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